Bet Blogger To bet or not to bet

28Oct/100

American Totalisator

The American Totalisator Company, formally known today as AmTote International and often referred to simply as AmTote, is a company which specializes in totalisator equipment used to control parimutuel betting at horse racing , greyhound racing and jai-alai facilities.

The company was founded by Harry L. Straus, whose interest in a fairer system of calculating and displaying odds and payouts on parimutuel betting came after an incident in 1927 at a Maryland racetrack, when a horse listed at 12:1 odds won, but only paid off at 4:1. Straus' new company installed its first equipment at Pimlico Race Course in Baltimore, Maryland, which displayed odds and payouts on illuminated boards, now known as tote boards. In 1933, American Totalisator installed its first electro-mechanical tote system at Arlington Park in Chicago, Illinois.

Since then, AmTote has installed tote systems throughout the world in more than 800 locations. The original electro-mechanical devices have given way to fully-computerized systems where bettors place and collect bets at the same window, self-service betting terminals, Internet- and telephone-based wagering, and "hub" systems to facilitate simulcast wagering.

AmTote's numeric displays were often seen on television game shows in the 1950s and 1960s, most notably the original version of The Price is Right. The company was also an investor in the manufacturer of the original UNIVAC computer system.

The company is based in Hunt Valley, Maryland. It was once owned by General Instrument, later sold to a division of Motorola. Today, AmTote International is a wholly-owned subsidiary of MI Developments Inc. (MID), corporate parent of several race tracks, including Pimlico.

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25Oct/100

Numbers games

The numbers game, or policy racket, is an illegal lottery played mostly in poor neighborhoods in U.S. cities, wherein the bettor attempts to pick three or four digits to match those that will be randomly drawn the following day. The gambler places his or her bet with a bookie at a tavern, or other semi-private place that acts as a betting parlor. A runner carries the money and betting slips between the betting parlors and the headquarters, called a numbers bank or policy bank. The name policy is from a similarity to cheap insurance, both seen as a gamble on the future.[1]

History

The game dates back at least to the beginning of the Italian lottery, in 1530. Policy shops, where bettors choose numbers, were in the U.S. prior to 1860. By the early 20th century, the game was associated with poor communities, and could be played for as little as $0.01. One of the game's attractions to low income and working class bettors was the ability to bet small amounts of money. Also, unlike state lotteries, bookies could extend credit to the bettor. In addition, policy winners could avoid paying income tax. Different policy banks would offer different rates, though a payoff of 600 to 1 was typical. Since the odds of winning were 1000:1, the expected profit for racketeers was enormous. In the northeastern United States this game was known as the "Nigger Pool", because of its presence in poor African-American communities.[2] The game was also popular in Italian neighborhoods, and it was known in Cuban communities as bolita ("little ball"). In 1875, a report of a select committee of the New York State Assembly stated that "the lowest, meanest, worst form ... [that] gambling takes in the city of New York, is what is known as policy playing."[3]

Winning number

One of the problems of the early game was to find a way to draw a random number. Initially, winning numbers were set by the daily outcome of a random drawing of numbered balls, or by spinning a "policy wheel", at the headquarters of the local numbers ring. The daily outcomes were publicized by being posted after the draw at the headquarters, and were often "fixed". The existence of rigged games, used to cheat players and drive competitors out of business, later led to the use of the last three numbers in the published daily balance of the United States Treasury. The use of a central independently chosen number allowed for gamblers from a larger area to engage in the same game and it made possible larger wins. When the Treasury began rounding off the balance many bookies began to use the "mutuel" number. This consisted of the last dollar digit of the daily total handle of the Win, Place and Show bets at a local race track, read from top to bottom.

For example, if the daily handle was:

  • Win $1004.25
  • Place $583.56
  • Show $27.61

then the daily number was 437.

By 1936, "The Bug" had spread to cities such as Atlanta where the winning number was determined by the last digit of that day's New York bond sales.[4]

Harlem

Francis A. J. Ianni, in his book Black Mafia: Ethnic Succession in Organized Crime writes: "By 1925 there were thirty black policy banks in Harlem, several of them large enough to collect bets in an area of twenty city blocks and across three or four avenues." By 1931, there were several big time numbers operators, James Warner, Stephanie St. Clair, Casper Holstein, Ellsworth Johnson, Wilfred Brandon, Jose Miro, Joseph Ison, Masjoe Ison and Simeon Francis.[5] The game survived despite periodic police crackdowns.[6]

Manipulation

Dutch Schultz is said to have rigged this system, thanks to an idea from Otto Berman, by betting heavily on certain races to change the Win, Place and Show numbers that determine the winning lottery number. This allegedly added ten percent to the Mob take.[7]

Odds and payout

A player's chance of winning on one number is one in 1000. In illegal numbers games, depending on time and place, winning on most numbers may pay off as high as 800 to 1 or as low as 600 to 1 (in Norristown, PA in the 1950s the payoff was 500 to 1). Typically, certain more popular numbers, known as cut numbers, have reduced payoffs, typically as much as 20% less than other numbers. Numbers such as 777 were cut numbers to prevent the possibility of the bank being overwhelmed by a hit on those numbers. The difference between the dollar amount of the tickets bought and the amount paid out is the vigorish, which the bookie keeps to cover overhead and make a profit for himself. In the Norristown, PA area part-time sub-runners collected bets on both numbers and horses in their neighborhoods and workplaces (factories, retail stores, movie theaters, the local police station, the county courthouse, etc.). The sub-runners earned 5% for this service. The runner then earned 15% of the numbers bets he "picked up" on his route, which left 30% for the bookie. The bookie "laid off" excess bets to a better financed local banker so as to keep his daily risk manageable. The local banker in turn laid off to a higher level banker when his daily book became too unbalanced. The bookie also paid upward through the banker a daily tax on his volume. This tax went up the line to the organization (based in New Jersey in the case of Norristown, PA in the 1950s) which defined and guaranteed his territory, and which also organized payments to politicians to reduce "heat" on the business. A measure of the effectiveness of this "protection" is that in the 1950s a runner in Norristown made daily stops at both the local police station and at the Montgomery County courthouse to pick up numbers and horse bets. In one case when the PA State Police were planning to do a raid on the business the first act they did after alerting the local police was to station a trooper at the police department switchboard to discourage warning from going out.

Legal version

Today, many state lotteries offer similar "daily numbers" games, relying typically on mechanical devices to draw the number. The state's rake is typically 50% rather than the 20%-40% of the numbers game. (Pennsylvania even calls its daily lottery "Daily Number".) Despite the existence of legal alternatives, some gamblers still prefer to play with a bookie for a number of reasons. Among them are the ability to bet on credit, better payoffs, the convenience of calling in one's bet on the telephone, and the avoidance of income tax.

Policy dealers

Sai Wing Mock (1879-1941), operator of policy game in Chinatown, New York in the 1900s
Albert J. Adams (1845-1906), operator of policy game in New York City in the 1900s[8]
Peter H. Matthews, operator of policy game in New York City in the 1900s
Joseph Vincent Moriarty, operator of numbers game in Hudson County, New Jersey in the 1950s
Ken Eto (1919-2004), operator of policy game in Chicago

Policy reformers

Lexow Committee, uncovered illegal gambling in New York City
Charles Henry Parkhurst
F. Norton Goddard

Timeline

1860 Private lotteries flourish in large cities
1894 Lexow Committee investigates[9]
1901 Albert J. Adams arrested in New York City
1906 Albert J. Adams takes his own life[8]
1916 Peter H. Matthews dies in prison
1964 New Hampshire starts the first modern US lottery

In popular culture

The 1948 film noir Force of Evil revolves around the numbers racket, with the plot hinging upon the workings of policy banks. The film tells of a gangster who is trying to take over all the banks in New York City by rigging the mutual numbers to come up 776 on Independence Day. Since everybody plays those numbers for the Fourth of July, the banks will go bankrupt filling the policies.

In Spike Lee's film Malcolm X, Denzel Washington's main character acts as a numbers runner for a character named "West Indian Archie" in Harlem.

Mobster Dutch Schultz's attempts to take control of the New York numbers rackets have been portrayed in two separate films: 1991's Billy Bathgate, about a young boy (Loren Dean) to whom Schultz (Dustin Hoffman) takes a liking, and who witnesses the gangster's decline and fall, and 1997's Hoodlum, which purports to tell the story of the mob war between Schultz (Tim Roth) and black gangster Ellsworth "Bumpy" Johnson (Laurence Fishburne) over control of the Harlem numbers racket. Both films were heavily fictionalized.

In an episode of Sanford and Son, Fred plans to bet on the "numbers" after he has a dream about having the winning number. His son Lamont is against his plan, but Fred bets $1 anyway and wins $600.

Further reading

  • New York Times; Wednesday May 19, 1883; Policy-dealers Punished.
  • Lawrence J. Kaplan and James M. Maher; The Economics of the Numbers Game in American Journal of Economics and Sociology;
  • Nathan Thompson; Kings: The True Story of Chicago's Policy Kings and Numbers Racketeers An Informal History; The Bronzeville Press ISBN 0972487506 (2003)

References

  1. ^ Sifakis, Carl. The Mafia Encyclopedia. Facts on File, 2005, p.336
  2. ^ Hailey, Alex. The Autobiography of Malcolm X. Ballantine, 1999, p.90.
  3. ^ Holice and Debbie, Our Police Protectors: History of New York Police Chapter 13, Part 1. Accessed on 4/2/2005
  4. ^ Associated Press, February 12, 1936
  5. ^ Harlem Gangs: The Numbers Game from Crime Library
  6. ^ Hess, Margaret (February 25, 1934). "Game the Police Are Seeking to Curb Draws Victims From the City's Poor.". New York Times. "The police offensive recently launched against the policy game has resulted in numerous arrests and the raiding of a "bank" in which three sacks of "slips" were discovered. Central depots in Harlem have also been closed and many collectors and bankers driven to cover."
  7. ^ Sifakis, pp.38-9
  8. ^ a b ""Al" Adams a Suicide, Following Misfortunes; Broken By Ill-health and Money Losses, He Shoots Himself. Sage & Co. Sank $2,000,000. He Also Felt Deeply The Disgrace Of Prison Sentence. Great Fortune Made In Policy Swindle." (PDF). New York Times. October 2, 1906. ""Al" Adams, known as the "Policy King," committed suicide yesterday morning by shooting himself. Members of his family and those in the apartment house who ... Standing before a mirror in his apartment on the fifteenth floor of the Ansonia apartment hotel, "Al" Adams, known as the "Policy King," committed suicide ..."
  9. ^ "Paid $500 To Schmittberger.". New York Times. October 12, 1894.  "Forget Says This Tribute Went To The Police Captain. The Agent Of The French Line Tells The Lexow Committee Of The Money Transaction. Complete Exposure Of The Policy Business In This City. A List Of 600 Places Where The Gambling Was Conducted. Only One Precinct Free From The Evil."

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13Oct/100

Thorne–Hawking–Preskill bet

Kip Thorne

 

The Thorne–Hawking–Preskill bet refers to a public bet on the outcome of the black hole information paradox made in 1997 by physics theorists Kip Thorne, Stephen Hawking and John Preskill.

Thorne and Hawking argued that since general relativity made it impossible for black holes to radiate, and lose information, the mass-energy and information carried by Hawking Radiation must be "new", and must not originate from inside the black hole event horizon. Since this contradicted the idea under quantum mechanics of microcausality, quantum mechanics would need to be rewritten.

Stephen Hawking

Preskill argued the opposite, that since quantum mechanics suggests that the information emitted by a black hole relates to information that fell in at an earlier time, the view of black holes given by general relativity must be modified in some way.

The winner of the bet would receive an encyclopedia of the losers choice from them.

In 2004, Hawking announced that he was conceding the bet, and that he now believed that black hole horizons should fluctuate and leak information, in doing so providing Preskill with a copy of Total Baseball, The Ultimate Baseball Encyclopedia.[1] Comparing the useless information obtainable from a black hole to "burning an encyclopedia", Hawking later joked, "I gave John an encyclopedia of baseball, but maybe I should just have given him the ashes."[2]

Thorne, however, remained unconvinced of Hawking's proof and declined to contribute to the award.[3] As of 2008, Hawking's argument that he has solved the paradox has not yet been accepted by the community, and a consensus has not yet been reached that Hawking has provided a strong enough argument that this is in fact what happens.

John Preskill

Hawking had earlier speculated that the singularity at the centre of a black hole could form a bridge to a "baby universe," a term coined by Canadian Astrophysicist Chad Bryden, into which the lost information could pass; such theories have been very popular in science fiction. But according to Hawking's new idea, presented at the 17th International Conference on General Relativity and Gravitation, on 21 July 2004 in Dublin, Republic of Ireland, black holes eventually transmit, in a garbled form, information about all matter they swallow:

The Euclidean path integral over all topologically trivial metrics can be done by time slicing and so is unitary when analytically continued to the Lorentzian. On the other hand, the path integral over all topologically non-trivial metrics is asymptotically independent of the initial state. Thus the total path integral is unitary and information is not lost in the formation and evaporation of black holes. The way the information gets out seems to be that a true event horizon never forms, just an apparent horizon.[4]

Another older bet – about the existence of black holes – was described by Hawking as an "insurance policy" of sorts. To quote from his book A Brief History of Time:

This was a form of insurance policy for me. I have done a lot of work on black holes, and it would all be wasted if it turned out that black holes do not exist. But in that case, I would have the consolation of winning my bet, which would win me four years of the magazine Private Eye. If black holes do exist, Kip will get one year of Penthouse. When we made the bet in 1975, we were 80% certain that Cygnus was a black hole. By now, I would say that we are about 95% certain, but the bet has yet to be settled.

—Stephen Hawking, A Brief History of Time (1988)[5]

In the updated and expanded edition of A Brief History of Time, Hawking states that "Although the situation with Cygnus X-1 has not changed much since we made the bet in 1975, there is now so much other observational evidence in favour of black holes that I have conceded the bet. I paid the specified penalty, which was a one year subscription to Penthouse, to the outrage of Kip's liberated wife."

References

  1. ^ Hawking, S. W. (10/2005). "Information loss in black holes". Physical Review D (American Physical Society) 72 (8): 4. doi:10.1103/PhysRevD.72.084013.
  2. ^ Hawking, Stephen. "My Life in Physics".
  3. ^ Preskill, John (24 July 2004). "On Hawking's Concession". California Institute of Technology.
  4. ^ "17th International Conference". GR17.
  5. ^ Hawking, Stephen (1988). A Brief History of Time. Bantam Books. ISBN 0-553-38016-8.

This article is licensed under the GNU Free Documentation License. It uses material from the Wikipedia.

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